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WHITHER GOEST JUDICIAL
NOMINATIONS, BROWN OR PLESSY? -
ADVICE AND CONSENT REVISITED
Nathaniel R. Jones*
HE appropriate role of the President and the Senate with respect to
considering the ideology and philosophy of federal judicial nominees,
have long been debated.1 President Nixon injected the subject into
the 1968 campaign and along with it, the issue of school desegregation. 2 In
nominating Judge Clarence Thomas to fill the seat of Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall on the United States Supreme Court, President Bush again ignited a
firestorm and drew into question the way in which the executive branch goes
about performing its constitutional responsibility of selecting judicial nomi-
nees and the process by which the Senate confirms these nominees for the
judicial branch.3 When this is combined with the avowed and openly ex-
* Speech delivered by Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cincinnati, Ohio. Eleventh Annual Alfred B. Murrah
Lecture, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, Tuesday, October 15, 1991.
1. See Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672,
687 (1989) (finding that the Framers did not intend for judicial philosophy to be a legitimate
reason for rejecting a judicial nominee); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in
Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE
68, 78-79 (1991) (arguing that there is no reason why the Senate should not ask ideological
questions); Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858, 867
(1990) (arguing that screening nominees on the basis of ideology "may be at odds with the goal
of establishing political influence over the Supreme Court"); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing
Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273, 276-83 (1989) (contending that the Consti-
tution allows both the Senate and the President to pursue political objectives in the appoint-
ment process but not to the exclusion of everything else).
2. See Melone, supra note 1, at 74 (stating that "Nixon ran on an anti-Warren Court
platform" and promised judges with a conservative ideology); Albert P. Melone, Too Little
Advice, Senatorial Responsibility, and Confirmation Politics, 75 JUDICATURE 187, 190 (1992)
[hereinafter Melone, Too Little Advice] (stating that during his 1968 campaign, President
Nixon promised to appoint southerners with strict constructionist views); Robert A. Pratt,
White Flight Doomed Racial Integration in Richmond Schools, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER,
Mar. 9, 1992, Editorial, at 13 (noting that President Nixon's campaign promised to end forced
busing by nominating more conservative judges).
3. See, e.g., What Other Newspapers Are Saying, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1991, at C21 (citing
Spain's EL PAIS) (arguing that the ideological imbalance of the Court, which would be in-
creased by the approval of Judge Thomas, threatens to create a set of regressive laws changing
American society); Donald J. Devine, Reform the Judicial Nomination Process Now: Five Pro-
posals for a Return to Senatorial Comity, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Nov. 12, 1991 (arguing
that the Senate's treatment of Thomas shows the need for changing the confirmation process);
Jordan Rossen, UAW General Counsel, The Senate Can and Should Reject Thomas, DET.
FREE PRESS, Sept. 24, 1991, at 12A (contending that the Senate has "not only the power but
the obligation" to achieve some balance in the court and therefore should reject Thomas);
William Pratt, An American Morality Without Morals, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at A14
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pressed intention of the current 4 and most recent presidents5 to remake the
federal judiciary, wounds that go back to slavery and the abolitionist period
are reopened.
Civil rights are at the heart of the effort to revise the role of the federal
courts and to restrict the activities of federal judges with respect to their
exercise of judicial power to remedy vestiges of slavery. Explore with me, if
you will, the implications of this crisis as it bears on selecting judicial candi-
dates and obtaining their confirmation. While the Thomas confirmation
hearings placed a bright spotlight on abortion 6 and natural law issues, 7
(later, of course, personal character), with passing reference paid to affirma-
tive action, 8 I nonetheless suggest that it has been the use of judicial power
to shape and implement remedies for racial discrimination that has both
triggered efforts to consider ideology and unleashed calls for "judicial
restraint."
Since 1980 the judicial nominating process has been the subject of consid-
erable comment because of the expressed determination of President Reagan
to effect a "sea change" in the selection and makeup of the federal judiciary.9
(arguing that Bush's nomination of the unqualified Thomas for ideological reasons showed a
contempt for the court and characterizing it as an act "of aggression against the constitutional
order").
4. See Melone, Too Little Advice, supra note 2, at 190 n.28 (stating that President Bush,
as well as other recent Republican Presidents, set a goal to change Supreme Court decisions
well into the future); Henry J. Reske, White House Begins Sifting Names for Brennan Replace-
ment, UPI, July 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting that Bush was
likely to choose from a number of federal judges appointed by Reagan during his attempt to
remake the judiciary in nominating a successor to Brennan); Now It's the Bush Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1992, at A26 (arguing that the Court's decision in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes
was "another payment on Mr. Bush's pledge to remake the federal judiciary").
5. William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 55 n.33 (1991) (recognizing that one of the Reagan Administration's
stated goals was to change the judiciary to generate different judicial results than those pro-
duced by President Carter's appointees); Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Reagan's Judges May Leave
Enduring Marks, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1988, at lB (asserting that Reagan
interpreted his election victories as endorsements of his call to change the Supreme Court and
quoting an Assistant Attorney General who said that the Administration's ideological screen-
ing was "probably the most thorough and comprehensive system for recruiting and screening
federal judicial candidates of any administration ever"); see also, Al Kamen, Two Conservatives
Likely to Join Appeals Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1985, at AI (citing Reagan's nomination of
two conservatives for spots on the D.C. Circuit as part of his "overall effort to secure a con-
servative federal judiciary"); Lincoln Caplan, Robert Bork, He Is an Opportunist, NEWSDAY,
July 12, 1987, at 4 (arguing that if the Senate approved Bork, Reagan would have "finally put
the ideological stamp on the Court that conservatives have yearned for").
6. See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF CLARENCE
THOMAS TO BE AN ASSOCIATE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, EXEC. REP. No.
15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1991) [hereinafter THOMAS HEARINGS]; see also S. REP. No. 15,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 108-08 (1991) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT No. 15] (citing TRANS.,
Sept. 11, 1991, at 102-05).
7. THOMAS HEARINGS, supra note 6, at 11; SENATE REPORT No. 15, supra note 6, at 12-
13 (citing TRANS., Sept. 10, 1991, at 135-37).
8. THOMAS HEARINGS, supra note 6, at 43, SENATE REPORT No. 15, supra note 6, at 44
(citing TRANS., Sept. 11, 1991, at 164-65).
9. See Andrea Neal, Reagan To Have Lasting Legacy on Courts, UPI, Sept. 4, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (President Reagan's determination was stated by
Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Policy in the
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The objective, Markman said, was to bring an end to "judicial activism"' 0
and to fill the federal courts with ideologically compatible judges who would
exercise "judicial restraint"'I1 as opposed to those, who, it was complained,
"legislate from the bench."' 12
This attempt has provoked reactions from scholars, 13 and political' 4 and
civil rights leaders.' 5 A 1987 Columbia Law Review article, for instance,
discussed the subject of appointees to the various courts of appeals, noting
that the change represented "the most consistent ideological or policy-orien-
tation screening of judicial candidates since the first term of Franklin
Roosevelt."' 6 The two nominations that President Bush offered up to the
Senate for its "advice and consent" appear to have involved an application of
an ideological litmus test, one of the aims of such a test being the curbing of
judicial activism.
Civil rights lawyers, particularly those who carry the Charles Houston
brief, regarded the shift in the appointment of minority judges to the federal
courts to be ominous.' 7 They cited to appointments in the eighties, as con-
Reagan administration). Reagan, who surpassed all other presidents with regard to judicial




13. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerunsky, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Ap-
pointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, The View From and To
Congress, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (1992) (analyzing how ideology has played a part and
should continue to play a part in Supreme Court appointments); Ronald R. Garet, Creation
and Commitment: Lincoln, Thomas, and the Declaration of Independence. 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1477, 1477 (1992) (noting that Thomas' views of natural law played a primary role in ideologi-
cal concerns over his appointment to the Supreme Court); William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judi-
cial Appointees & Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 52 (1991) (asserting that the
Reagan Administration pursued ideological uniformity with an unmatched degree of single-
minded vigor); Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the Presidert's Men? A Study
of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM L. REV. 766, 772
(1987) (analyzing Reagan's judicial appointments to determine if he applied a litmus test); see
also Ted Gest, The New Frontiers For Legal Warriors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 5,
1988, at 32 (considering the impact of the Reagan appointed conservative judiciary as the post-
Reagan era began); Michael Kinsley, It's OK to Ask, NAT'L REV., Aug. 5, 1991, at 4 (discuss-
ing whether the Senate should consider a Supreme Court nominee's judicial philosophy prior
to confirmation).
14. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S16,507-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (commentary on the use of privacy, abortion and racial preferences as litmus tests for
Supreme Court appointments); 137 CONG. REC. S14,295-97 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Grassley) (stating that the role of the Senate in the confirmation hearings is not to
apply a litmus test).
15. See, e.g., Gest, supra note 13, at 32 (predicting that the ACLU and other civil liberties
and civil rights organizations will play a great role in future Supreme Court nominations);
Joseph L. Rauch, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 213, 241 (1990) (criticizing the Reagan Administration's pressuring of Chief
Justice Burger to resign in order to move the Court further to the right).
16. Tomasi & Velona, supra note 13, at 768 (quoting Sheldon Goldman, Reorganizing the
Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313, 315 (1985)).
17. Charles Hamilton Houston, Dean of Howard University Law School from 1929 to
1935, espoused an aggressive approach to civil rights, utilizing any available means. "Given an
immoral America, the NAACP campaign required that lawyer-social engineers use the Consti-
tution statutes, and 'whatever science demonstrates or imagination invents' both to foster and
to order social change for a more humane society. This 'Houstonian jurisprudence' pervaded
1992]
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trasted to those made during the Carter four-year presidency of the seven-
ties,18 and worried over what this portends for the Houstonian school of
jurisprudence in light of the attacks leveled against judicial activist judges. 19
To these lawyers, the very heart of the Houstonian view of constitutional
interpretation and enforcement of civil rights requires the affirmative use of
judicial power. 20
The shift that has seemingly provoked anxiety relates to these judicial ap-
pointments. Between 1981 and 1988, the Reagan administration appointed a
total of 372 judges. 21 Of that number, only seven were African American,
fifteen were Hispanic and two were Asian Americans. 22 During the same
period, there were thirty-five appointments made to the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and the district courts within the Sixth Circuit.23 None of
them were African American or Hispanic.24 Between 1989 and 1992, the
Bush Administration made 206 district and court of appeals appointments
with eleven being African American, and thirteen being Hispanic.25 During
this period, there were sixteen additional appointments made within the
courts of the Sixth Circuit. 26 Again, there were no African Americans in
those appointments. 27 The district court seat once held by Judge Robert M.
Duncan, an African American of the Southern District of Ohio, was filled by
a white appointee. 28
In summary, during the Reagan-Bush years (1981-1992) there have been
579 federal judges appointed with only nineteen being African Americans
and twenty-six being Hispanics. By way of a contrast, in the period between
1976 and 1980, President Carter appointed a total of fifty-six judges to the
all Houston did in the NAACP." GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMIL-
TON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 133 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary.- The First Term Appointments,
68 JUDICATURE 313, 321-22, 326 (1985) (noting that the first term of the Reagan presidency
spawned the lowest number of African Americans since the Eisenhower administration, which
appointed none; and, however, the number of Hispanics appointed during Reagan's first term
was second only to the Carter Administration); Kovacic, supra note 13, at 56-114 (examining
the votes of Carter, Reagan and Bush judicial appointees to the federal courts of appeals in
antitrust cases).
19. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of The Supreme Court.- Judicial Activism or Self-
Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 118, 121 (1987) (arguing that judicial activists view the Supreme
Court as a "political body actually and properly engaged in pursuing policy goals"); Goldman,
supra note 18, at 329 (noting that the Reagan Administration has "seize[d] the historic oppor-
tunity to reshape American politics" through its judicial appointments).
20. See Cox, supra note 19, at 135-37 (discussing the application of judicial activism to
cases such as affirmative action, abortion and individual rights).
21. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989).
22. Id. at 322.
23. Nathaniel R. Jones Address on African American History at the Administrative Of-
fice of the U.S. Courts (Feb. 13, 1992) [hereinafter Address, U.S. Courts].
24. Letter from Elaine R. Jones, Deputy Director-Counsel 1, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund to Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the South Circuit (Dec. 9, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter NAACP Letter].
25. See Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDI-
CATURE 294, 299, 303 (1991).
26. Address, U.S. Courts, supra note 23.
27. NAACP Letter, supra note 24.
28. Records of the United States Sixth Circuit Judicial Council.
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courts of appeal.29 Of that number, nine were African American, two were
Hispanic and one was an Asian American. 30 On the district courts, there
were 202 appointments made of which twenty-eight were African American,
fourteen Hispanic and one Asian American. 31 Judge A. Leon Higginbot-
ham of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted
that the Reagan-Bush record reveals only two of 115 appeals court appoint-
ments have gone to African Americans. 32 The breakdown is as follows: In
the eight years of the Reagan administration there were eighty-three appel-
late appointments. Only one went to an African American--Clarence
Thomas. After a brief stint on the D.C. Court of Appeals, he was tapped to
be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. As Judge Higginbotham fur-
ther noted, by 1993, six of the ten African Americans sitting on the courts of
appeal will be eligible for retirement. 33 Many of these judges were appointed
during the period when the federal courts were enforcing civil rights
remedies.
The phrase, "judicial activism," is a euphemism for describing what
courts have been doing since Brown v. Board of Education 34 to implement
remedies fashioned to redress violations of the constitutional and other civil
rights of American racial minorities. 35 With the enactment of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,36 and the other civil rights statutes,37 federal courts have pro-
vided the forum for additional categories of litigants, including women 38 and
persons with disabilities, 39 who have a broad range of claims. The drive
29. Id. at 303.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 299.
32. A. Leon Higginbotham, The Case of the Missing Black Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1992, at A21.
33. Id.
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. See Griffin v.Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) reaches private
conspiracies aimed at discriminatory deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights; United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971) (proof of subjective intent to
discriminate not necessary; only proof that defendant intended to perform discriminatory act is
required); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (school desegregation); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968) (racial discrimination in housing sales); Gomillion v. Lightfood, 364 U.S.
415 (1963) (representation in desegregation cases); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(all-white political primary); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially restrictive land
covenants).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-1975d, 2000(a)-(h)(6) (1989)).
37. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1988); Civil Rights
Acts of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284k, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-233,
241-42, 245, 2101-2102, 2253; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1312, 1321-1326, 3619, 3631
(1988)); see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (changes to state's voting
laws must be approved by U.S. Attorney General); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth
Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971) (prohibiting racial discrimination in rental housing).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2). See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer may not refuse to hire women with young children while
hiring men with such children); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)
(employer's no-marriage rule for stewardesses violated Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
39. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
1992]
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against this "activism" collides with the use of the courts by aggrieved per-
sons in search of redress. Effects of this collision have penetrated the judicial
nomination and confirmation process provided for in the Constitution.4°
The move to rein in judicial power by selecting less active judges, it seems
to me, imposes a greater obligation on the Senate to be meticulously resolute
in discharging its advice and consent duty. If care is not taken by the Sen-
ate, which is charged with confirming Supreme Court justices and federal
judges,41 I predict that the rush to curb judicial activism may likely result in
a turning back of the clock on civil rights remedies.
Harold Cruse speaks of "cycles of civil rights."'42 He reminds us of the
first civil rights movement, which began immediately after the Civil War
ended. During that time, the reconstruction era, blacks or African Ameri-
cans found themselves for the first time in positions of leadership and en-
gaged in meaningful participation in the governance of the nation.43 That
era ended all too soon, in 1896 with Plessy v. Ferguson," and the civil rights
cycle would not wax again for sixty years.45
Cruse goes on to say that, looking back, it becomes obvious that the sec-
ond most recent civil rights cycle had already begun to wane in the late*
sixties.46 How the brakes began to be applied and by whom, need to be
understood if any sense is to be made out of what is happening with respect
to judicial nominations and the confirmation process in these times. There-
fore, I submit, that if Harold Cruse's thesis is correct, and the civil rights
cycle had begun to wane in the sixties, surely in this day, with the retirement
of Justice Thurgood Marshall from the United States Supreme Court, it may
be reaching its lowest ebb.
Granted, Justice Marshall's retirement was inevitable. It need not, how-
ever, signal the end of this civil rights cycle. It has come at a time when
African Americans had placed much of their hope in the judicial system,
particularly the Supreme Court. In the words of Harvard legal scholar Ran-
dall Kennedy, "with Marshall, we were assured at least one justice who
would insist that the interests of those who have been oppressed receive fair
and full consideration before the country's highest tribunal.1 47
I earlier made a reference to the Houston brief and the Houstonian school
of jurisprudence. 48 It was the late Charles Hamilton Houston who devel-
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611); Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
41. Id.
42. HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A CRITICAL STUDY OF MINORITIES AND
AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY 7-8 (1987).
43. Id. at 12-17, 179, 354.
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1986).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Telephone Interview with Randall Kennedy, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
(Mar. 3, 1993).
48. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; McNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 17, at
57-106; J. Clay Smith, Principles Supplementing the Houstonion School of Jurisprudence, 32
How. L.J. 493 (1989).
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oped what has come to be known as the Houstonian school of jurisprudence.
Houston was the Dean of Howard Law School at the time Thurgood Mar-
shall studied there. He developed the rationale, used in the Brown v. Board
of Education,49 litigation of attacking discrimination under the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 The basis of this rationale was
his theory of social engineering,51 a concept which he taught to students in
his jurisprudence course at Howard, and on the road in his continuing legal
education seminars. We learn from his biographer, Genna Rae McNeil, that
Houstonian jurisprudence necessitated thinking broadly about "societies,
laws, and classes of people."' 52 Houston asked his students to consider ques-
tions such as: "which nineteenth century school of jurisprudence emphati-
cally denied the power of conscious effort to change or modify the course of
law and why?" 53 To pass his jurisprudence course, one had to be able to
"sketch the philosophy of Kant,"'54 and to "[w]rite a short discussion of the
sociological aspect of capital punishment as applied under our present form
of the administration of justice in criminal cases."55 Houston insisted that
African American lawyers and lawyers-to-be not avoid their duty to be so-
cial engineers. 56 A social engineer was, in his definition, "a highly skilled,
perceptive, sensitive lawyer who understood the Constitution of the United
States and knew how to explore its uses in the solving of problems ... and
'bettering the conditions of the underprivileged citizens.' -57 Houstonian ju-
risprudence interprets the Constitution creatively and innovatively for the
protection of a minority group "unable to adopt direct action to achieve its
place in the community and nation."58
Houston envisioned cadres of African American lawyers litigating cases
across the country, using theories based on his jurisprudence. 59 Thurgood
Marshall, a shaper and disciple of Houstonian jurisprudence, as well as a
protege of Houston, did just that, and managed to tear down the wall of
legalized segregation locked in place in 1896 by Plessy v. Ferguson.6° Hous-
ton left an enduring mark on the Howard Law School and American civil
rights litigation. He required that these lawyers, as social engineers, "use the
constitution, statutes, and 'whatever science demonstrates or imagination in-
vents' both to foster and to order social change for a more humane
society."' 61
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
51. McNEIL, supra note 17, at 76-85.
52. Id. at 67, 70-71.
53. Id. at 66.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 67 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, "Juris-prudence Examination," Dec.
18, 1924, CHH Papers).
56. Id. at 84.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 85 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, "Outline of Lecture, New School,"
Dec. 12, 1946, CHH/H&G Firm Files).
59. Id. at 76-85.
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
61. McNEIL, supra note 17, at 133.
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The modem trend of the judicial selection and confirmation process
places Houstonian jurisprudence at risk, and with it, the gains racial minori-
ties have realized by using it. Until recently, presidents generally carried out
their duty to nominate justices to the Supreme Court, without necessarily
elevating political philosophy or ideology above the more significant national
interest of appointing people whose careers indicated that they would serve
creditably on the bench. Presidents Reagan and Bush, even more so than
President Nixon, consistently departed from that custom in selecting judicial
candidates by instituting a process that ensures that the candidates' beliefs
are in ideological - as distinguished from political - alignment with their
own. These presidents have made it clear that they want to appoint only
"strict constructionists," or nonactivist judges. 62 In other words, a candi-
date has had to pass an ideological, as distinguished from political party
affiliation, litmus test in order to be nominated. Tragically, as recent events
have demonstrated, there is a fundamental and near irreconcilable clash be-
tween the test of non-activism and Houstonian jurisprudence. Houston and
Marshall argued, 63 and record evidence in countless civil rights cases
demonstrated, 64 that, historically, law was used to reinforce discrimination.
Thus, a vigorous use of the legal system is required to dismantle that which
was built.
Racial minorities are not the only groups that will mourn the passing of
this jurisprudence, if indeed it goes. Part of the brilliance of Houston's ra-
tionale of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it can be used, and has been
used, to remedy discrimination across the board, including, notably, age65
and gender discrimination. 66 Enforcement of the widely heralded Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act 67 (ADA) will also be premised on Houston's
theories.
The search for judicial nominees of a "non-active" stripe indicates the
Houstonian-based laws and legal theories are likely to result in much nar-
62. David Hoffman, Bush Draws Contrasts with Rivalb "Great Divide" Cited. Summit
Effort Vowed: Poll Lead is 13 Points, WASH POST, Nov. 2, 1988, at AI (quoting Bush: "The
excessive judicial activism of the 60's and 70's is the reason Americans turned against that kind
of liberals in the 80's. This is no time to go back .... ); George E. Curry, I Don't Want
Activist Judges, Reagan Says, Cmi. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1985, at CII (quoting Reagan: "So I intend
to go right on appointing ... individuals who understand the danger of short-circuiting the
electoral process and disenfranchising the people through judicial activists. I want judges...
who harbor the deepest regard for the Constitution and its traditions - one of which is judicial
restraint.")
63. Nathaniel R. Jones, A Tribute to Justice Marshall, Lecture at University of Louisville
School of Law (Feb. 1992).
64. See generally Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REV.
1267 (1992) (discussing a brief history of race-related cases and how the Rehnquist Court
handled them).
65. MCNEIL, supra note 17, at 76-85.
66. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (holding that
a party seeking to uphold a statute classifying individuals on the basis of sex will carry burden
of providing "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification); Stanton v. Stanton,
429 U.S. 501, 503 (1977) (treating males and females differently for child support purposes
violates Equal Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (statutory classifi-
cations by gender are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1992), 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1992).
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rower relief. It remains to be seen how non-activists will distinguish between
race cases and, for instance, ADA cases. The Supreme Court, however, in
another context, is already poised to minimize the effectiveness of - if not
outright overturn - such laws and theories, as Justice Marshall emphasized
in his final dissent in Payne v. Tennessee.68 The Payne majority overruled
two recent Supreme Court cases:69 Booth v. Maryland,70 which "held that
'victim impact' evidence ... could not constitutionally be introduced during
the penalty phase of a capital trial; '71 and South Carolina v. Gathers,72
which upheld Booth against an attack on that ruling.73 These rulings are
particularly important to African Americans because of the disproportionate
application of capital punishment to African Americans. 74 In a puzzling
departure from a traditional notion of judicial restraint, the Supreme Court
majority in Payne, on the third try, upheld the constitutionality of such evi-
dence over the force of the precedential cases. 75 Justice Marshall, in his
dissent, explains why, saying:
Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking
.... Neither the law nor the facts supporting Booth and Gathers under-
went any change in the last four years. Only the personnel of this court
did.
In dispatching Booth and Gathers to their graves, today's majority
ominously suggests that an even more extensive upheaval of this court's
precedents may be in store .... [This opinion] sends a clear signal that
scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for
reconsideration .... 76
Thus, Justice Marshall explicitly linked the appointments of justices and
judges during the last two administrations to the erosion of the laws protect-
ing various politically unempowered minority groups.
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham has expressed this view eloquently:
[T]hough one cannot always rely on the United States Supreme Court
or the federal courts for a total vindication of human rights of minori-
ties, nevertheless until now, the United States Supreme Court has been
the institution of government that most consistently has checked gov-
ernmental efforts to discriminate on the basis of race. With this histori-
cal insight, it is obvious that the most effective way to weaken the fabric
of human and civil rights for minorities would probably be to change
the balance of the Court so that gradually, in a slow but determined
process, the Court would repudiate its historic role in the protection of
68. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2599.
70. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
71. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2619 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 509).
72. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
73. Id. at 810.
74. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 (1972) (citing study which found
that application of death penalty is unequal between blacks and whites); Marc Riedel, Discrim-
ination in the Imposition of Death Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders
Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 261 (1976) (finding continuing dis-
proportionate death sentencing of non-whites after Furman).
75. Payne, IIl S. Ct. at 2607.
76. Id. at 2619.
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individual and minority rights.77
I contend that what Judge Higginbotham suggested hypothetically is, in
fact, happening now, and has been happening for some years.
Persons may and are legitimately asking whether the judicial appointment
process is being well served when it is used to effect such a dramatic ideologi-
cal change in the makeup of the courts. 78 This is not to suggest that past
administrations have not nominated persons whose political views were
compatible with those of the sitting president. What is being debated now is
a practice that goes beyond this. Thus, it has been questioned whether the
presidents who look to ideology are properly carrying out their constitutional
role in nominating candidates for the Supreme Court.79
Another daunting question is whether the Senate, which has an equal con-
stitutional role in the appointment process, is ultimately fulfilling its role in
confirming - or not confirming - those nominees. Article II, section 2 of
the United States Constitution confers upon the President the duty to "nom-
inate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [to] appoint
... Judges of the Supreme Court."80 Unless the Senate gives its "advice and
consent," the nominee may not become a Justice.81 The language of the
Constitution alone shows that the Senate's role in the process is equally im-
portant to that of the President. No one can persuasively argue that the
Senate's job is merely to "rubber stamp" the President's choice of candi-
dates. But it is not enough to say what the Senate's job is not.
If the number of discussions, articles and other aspects of the debate on
the issue are any indication, many people agree that defining the Senate's
role is critical.82 I was quite interested to read the views of Senator Orrin
Hatch on this subject, written in 1989, after the rejection of Judge Robert
77. A. Leon Higginbotham, Racism in America and South African Courts: Similarities
and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 587 (1990).
78. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985) (examining
generally how the choice of Supreme Court Justices has shaped American history and arguing
that choosing Justices for ideological purposes will create poor Justices); Douglas Kmiec, Judi-
cial Selection and the Pursuit of Justice: The Unsettled Relationship Between Law and Moral-
ity, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (examining tension between whether law should be
interpreted and applied in light of moral considerations); Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent
in Theory and Practice, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075 (1992) (arguing that merit is no longer the
lodestar of federal judicial appointment); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate,
The Constitution & The Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992) (suggesting a return
to the confirmation process contemplated by the text and structure of the Constitution).
79. See TRIBE, supra note 78, at 125-37 (examining the role of each branch of government
in the appointment process, and arguing that single issue or cases justices will decide cases long
after the particular controversy has been decided); Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A
Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
969 (1992) (condemning George Bush for nominating Thomas based on latter's race and ideol-
ogy, but arguing that the process is fundamentally sound).
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
81. Id.
82. See generally Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 78; Robert F. Nagel, Confirmation Con-
troversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice: Advice, Consent and Influence, 84 Nw. U.
L. REV. 858 (1990) (examining the drift toward a norm of active Senate participation in the
confirmation process); Stephen L. Carter, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process:
The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988) (suggesting ways of reducing chaos in
the Supreme Court appointment process).
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Bork's Supreme Court nomination.83 Senator Hatch wrote that the Senate's
role is quite secondary to the President's, not only in time, but in signifi-
cance.84 From the constitutional language previously quoted, Senator Hatch
infers a "common sense observation," on the part of the framers, that a di-
verse congressional body would have difficulty overcoming politics, jealous-
ies, and intrigues to select the best candidate,"8 5 and, therefore, they "voted
to vest the nomination power in the President. 8s6 He added that the Sen-
ate's function is merely a check, to "[p]revent nepotism and unfit
characters." 87
Besides this "Constitutional" objection to the type of active role the Sen-
ate played in Judge Bork's hearings, Senator Hatch argues that it is simply
bad policy:
When we undertake to judge a judge according to political, rather than
legal, criteria, we have stripped the judicial office of all that makes it a
distinct separated power. If the general public begins to measure judges
by a political yardstick and if the judges themselves begin to base their
decisions on political criteria, we will have lost the reasoning processes
of the law which have served so well to check political fervor over the
past two hundred years.88
This argument has, at first blush, some appeal. Upon closer examination,
however, the argument appears to be flawed. Hatch's comments are directed
toward the Senate; however, they are just as applicable to the President. If
Judge Bork was defeated "simply" because of the Senate's politics, he was all
the same, nominated - and other candidates were not nominated - "sim-
ply" because of a President's concern for ideology. Thus, this question may
be asked: When a President openly sets out to appoint only those who pass
his ideological, as distinguished from a political litmus test, does not the
Senate then have, not just a right, but an obligation to assure itself that the
candidate's ideological views will not interfere with that person's ability to
be fair?
Former Republican Senator Charles Mathias has a well-reasoned response
to that question. He says:
A President is entitled to reflect his judicial and political philosophy in
his judicial nominations. If a nominee is an intelligent and capable indi-
vidual, and is qualified by reasons of temperament, training in the law,
experience at the bar, and commitment to community service, no sena-
tor will object to the nomination simply because the nominee shares the
President's political orientation. History provides ample testimony to
this fact, of which the unanimous confirmation of Justice Scalia is the
most recent example. If, however, it should become apparent that an
individual has been selected because of his philosophical orientation
rather than his professional competence, the Senate has a duty to
83. Orrin G. Hatch, Modern Marbury Myths, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 891 (1989).








Mathias' point is crucial to the current debate on this topic. President Bush
has presented two successive candidates whose fitness was called into ques-
tion. Some argue that the presidential search for candidates utilizes a closed
list - closed, for example, to those who might be susceptible to a Hous-
tonian-type briefs. The point is that a line is drawn at the ideological rather
than political borders; far to the right of the traditional division between
Republican and Democrat, or liberal and conservative.
Two other rationales are offered for active Senate participation in the ap-
pointment process. First, Professor Lawrence Tribe offers a thesis that pure
and simple historical precedent justifies the Senate's ideological investiga-
tions of nominees.90 Notwithstanding Senator Hatch's assertion to the con-
trary, Tribe cites six occasions - not including Bork's candidacy - on
which the Senate scrutinized and rejected "Supreme Court nominees ... on
the basis of their political, judicial, and economic philosophies. "91 Notably,
the first such rejection was of a candidate nominated by George
Washington.92
The second rationale offered by Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., more like
that of Mathias, 93 argues that the Constitution itself requires the Senate to
reject certain candidates on ideological grounds.94 In his own words, "a
Senator properly may, or even at some times in duty must, vote against a
nominee to [the Supreme] Court, on the ground that the nominee holds
views which when transposed into judicial decisions, are likely, in the Sena-
tor's judgment, to be very bad for the country."195 Black has found "nothing
textual ... structural, . . . prudential .... [or] historical" that supports any
need for senatorial deference to the President's choice of candidate, or for a
"presumption of the nominee's fitness for the office."'96 Contrary to Hatch,
Black believes that the framers designed a "broad role" for the Senate to
play in the appointment process.97 Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist
Papers, called the Senate's role "a considerable and salutary restraint upon
the [President's] conduct." 98
Senator Mathias recognizes the dual nature of the Senate's role. 99 While
"advice and consent" is treated by many as redundant, Mathias addresses
what actions the Senate might properly take in advising the President before
he makes his nomination. 100 He suggests that Senators can form committees
89. Charles Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of The United States Senate in the
Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 204-05 (1987) (emphasis added).
90. See TRIBE, supra note 78, at 107.
91. Id. at 92.
92. Id. at 86-90.
93. Mathias, supra note 89.
94. Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L.J. 657, 657 (1970).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 663-64.
97. Id.
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 576 (Alexander Hamilton).
99. Mathias, supra note 89, at 201.
100. Id. at 203.
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of lawyers and laypersons within their respective states to help field recom-
mendations for vacant seats. 10 Such efforts at gathering information on
qualified potentials for the bench have in the past been "worthwhile."' 10 2
As I have indicated, the term "judicial activism" has come to be a term of
derision for decisions of courts that commanded the implementation of rem-
edies designed to correct discriminatory conditions.103 An obvious political
judgment was made to restrict the activity of federal judges with respect to
reshaping institutions affected by decisions of courts. Because this intention
was expressed during political campaigns and those who espoused it were
elected, it is being contended that the majority of Americans have thereby
consented to the alteration of the makeup of and redirection of the federal
courts. This change is justified on the basis of the majority having prevailed
politically. Of course, under our Constitution, the majority is limited as to
what it can do with respect to overriding the rights of minorities. Thus,
there are those raising questions about the extent to which election results
are being used to validate policies that can drastically affect the ability of
persons to vindicate basic constitutional rights.104 They reasonably insist
that to the extent that ideology controls the judicial selection process, it be-
comes imperative that the other half of the constitutional duty, i.e., advice
and consent, be discharged with great sensitivity and care by the Senate.105
What to one person is judicial overreaching or "judicial activism," is, to
another person, judicial power being exercised in the vindication of funda-
mental rights. From the standpoint of the national interest, the appropriate
questions are whether the various remedies that courts have been enforcing
relate to injustices suffered by minorities or women, and how are they work-
ing? Also, is positive change taking place? The answer to each question is
"yes." Civil rights enforcement by courts, as well as voluntary actions, have
resulted in positive change. It is the fear of having these remedies undercut
by judicial selection policies premised on ideology that has intensified and
heated up the debate over the confirmation process.
This essay has sought to pose the question of whether the judicial selection
process, as recently conducted, is propelling the nation backward toward
Plessy v. Ferguson's separate-but-equal doctrine,' 0 6 or forward toward the
further fulfillment of the promise of Brown v. Board of Education.0 7 The
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
104. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988) (arguing that while public opinion has some say in who shall
become judges of the Supreme Court, "[t]he Senate has the duty to reject any nominee whose
appointment it believes will not advance the public good as the Senate understands it"); Nina
Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1213 (1988) (discussing the role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in investigating the
role of the Supreme Court nominees and concluding that "[t]he Senate should pay careful
attention to the opinions of the people without compromising the independence of its decision
or converting the advice and consent function into a majoritarian election procedure").
105. Totenberg, supra note 104, at 1227-28; Monaghan, supra note 104, at 1206-08.
106. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
107. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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holding of Plessy in 1896 and Brown's 1954 decision are polar opposites. The
Houston-Marshall strategy that led to the overturning of Plessy relied upon
skillful advocacy and what, as I have noted, many today derisively dismiss as
"judicial activism."108 Also, as previously indicated, the last two presidents,
as did Nixon and candidate Wallace before them, have led the assault on so-
called "activist judges" and promised to appoint only those who eschew the
Houstonian type of activism. 109 Of late, those promises, to a disturbing de-
gree, have been kept.
The promise to stack the courts with judges who will refrain from the
affirmative exercise of judicial power led to the recent convulsive confirma-
tion battles in the Senate. Both the presidential power to appoint, and the
Senate's power to advise and consent, while derived from the Constitution,
are essentially political exercises. At the same time, however, the purpose is
to produce judges for the third branch of government - a branch charged
with interpreting the Constitution and in the words of the late Chief Justice
John Marshall, of "saying what the law is." 110
What has fanned the flames of controversy in recent years is the charge
that presidents, in discharging their constitutional duty of appointment,
have loaded the dice by injecting ideological considerations into the process
on a take it or leave it basis. Thus, the search to determine the ability of
nominees to fairly discharge their judicial duties, at least with respect to the
controversies of historic social import, is conducted more searchingly by sen-
ators who have the constitutional duty to either give or withhold advice and
consent.
Those who are criticizing the loading of the dice are dismissed as being
nothing more than special interest groups. That characterization by persons
in power is perplexing, indeed. Such a characterization of organized citizen
activity is cynical at best, and demeans an essential component of the demo-
cratic process. The Constitution establishes the three coordinate branches of
government with roles for each. When one branch, the Executive, exercises
its power in a way that may adversely affect the ability of citizens to seek
vindication of their rights through another branch, citizens so affected have
every right to organize and utilize the channels open to them for an expres-
sion of their views to those with a constitutional duty of commensurate
granting.
The condition that is currently being complained of is this: that the Exec-
utive branch of government has sought to preempt and control the other two
branches of government. It is said that through its judicial appointing
108. See, e.g., W. John Moore, Righting the Courts, 24 NAT'L J., 200, 201 (1992) ("People
like that represent the worst judicial activism has to offer." (quoting Thomas L. Jipping, direc-
tor of the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation's Center for Law and Democ-
racy)); William H. Mellor, III & Clint Bolick, The Quest for Justice: National Rights and the
Future of Public Interest Law, Heritage Foundation Report: The Heritage Lecture No. 342,
Sept. 10, 1991 (Such egregious practices as expansive application of environmental laws and
the creation of new welfare "rights" came to symbolize for conservatives all that was wrong
with the way courts functioned under the influence of judicial activism.).
109. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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power, the Executive has reshaped, from an ideological point of view, the
federal judiciary. 1" It is expected that this reshaped judiciary will interpret
the Constitution, construe civil rights statutes and those dealing with indi-
vidual rights, narrowly, and do so with little regard to the intent of Con-
gress. 112 Moreover, the Executive, through the use of the veto (also a
constitutionally derived power' 13) or the threat thereof, frustrates attempts
of Congress to clarify what it perceives to be a misconstruction of its intent
with respect to civil rights remedies. 1 4 Then, it is charged, the Executive
rounds it all off by selectively and narrowly enforcing laws, with the assur-
ance that the "reshaped" judiciary, eschewing an "activist" role, will not
disturb those decisions."15
If critics are correct, this can lead to a return to the frustration of the pre-
Brown period and may generate the same anger that led to the public disrup-
tions associated with direct action campaigns and civil disorders of the Six-
ties. It is the latter concern that prompts me to raise this question in the
hope that lawyers will take the lead in helping the public understand the
risks involved in the judicial selection and nomination process being used, to
the extent that it is used, as an instrument for returning the nation to an
inglorious past - a past of which the nation cannot be very proud.
Ill. See Goldman, supra note 25; Tom Teepan, The Politics of Filling a Court Seat: For
GOP, Appointing Justices Became Ideological Exercise, L.A. DAILY, July 3, 1991, at 8.
112. See Goldman, supra note 25, at 306.
113. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl.2.
114. For example, this occurred when President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990.
See Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U.
COLO. L. REV. 37, 37-38 (1991) (noting that Congress has enacted eight statutes expressly to
overrule Supreme Court decisions in the field of civil rights); Leland Ware, The Civil Rights
Act of 1990: A Dream Deferred, 10 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 1 (1991) (stating that the 1990
Civil Rights Act was enacted to overrule recent Supreme Court Decisions but was vetoed by
Bush).
115. See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the
High Court or Transforming Its Role?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 393 (1990).
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